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Peacebuilding as a concept has become increasingly popular over
the 1990s. However, there are few common understandings of the term.
Definitions seem to be context bound and vary between voluntary
groups, communities at large, policy-makers, politicians and funders.
This picture is complicated further when the concept of reconciliation
is introduced into the mix. That said, I will not dwell on different
definitions of peacebuilding, but at the outset would like to make
one very basic distinction. I would like to differentiate between
‘peacemaking’ and ‘peacebuilding’. Norbert Ropers provides a broad
definition of these when he writes: Peacemaking is understood to
mean the attempt to tackle some concrete problem in a process that
generally begins with a difference of interests, proceeds in the
form of negotiations, and in the end—if successfully dealt with—leads
to an agreement concerning the conduct of both sides. Peacebuilding,
on the other hand, covers a wider area and, in most cases, a longer
time-scale. Its aim is a change in the social structures underlying
the conflict, and a change in the attitudes of the parties to the
conflict (1).
It is the “wider area” of peacebuilding and “longer term time-scale”
that I am concerned with in this talk. I am primarily interested
in the ideas of building cultures of peace, reconciliation, attitudinal
change, and altering the general political and social climate of
the society over time. This is very different to thinking about
peacebuilding as something akin simply to reconstruction, demobilisation
and securing political agreement. Needless to say, using this broad
approach makes reflecting on where peacebuilding may go in Northern
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland post-2006, challenging. To this
end, I would like to draw out some broad points that will hopefully
help frame the discussion. The first of these—as alluded to above—is
that if we are talking about building peace in societies coming
out of conflict we need to recognise, as obvious as it sounds, that
it is a long-term, complex and non-linear process. As John Paul
Lederach notes, what is needed for genuine peacebuilding is to:
Explore peacebuilding as processes of change within a more expansive
view of context and time relevant to but not limited by the discrete
chronology entertained with the term post-agreement (2).
What this means is that we cannot tie peacebuilding—and in the context
of today’s event, funding strategies for it—simply to the development
of the so-called concrete markers of peace such as the signing of
agreements, or the cessation of hostility. There is a marked difference
between making peace and building peace as noted above. Building
peace needs to be “expansive” in its horizon, operations and strategy,
and operationalised tactically over time. Strategies for peacebuilding
also need to reflect social complexity, rather than trying to manipulate
and define it too rigidly. To this end, I was struck by the definition
of reconciliation developed by ADM/CPA in their Programme for Peace
and Reconciliation. This definition begins to tease out some of
this complexity. The ADM/CPA define reconciliation as follows: "Reconciliation
is a process whereby past trauma, injury and suffering is acknowledged
and healing/restorative action is pursued; it is a process whereby
relationship breakdown is addressed and sustainable relationships
created; it is a process whereby the culture and structure which
gives rise to conflict and estrangement are transformed or reconstructed
with a view to creating an equitable, diverse and interdependent
community"(3).
The programme goes on to produce a helpful matrix of reconciliation
that stresses the different depths of reconciliation work (e.g.
contact awareness understanding, joint projects, raising conflictual
issues, and changing culture and structure). It also talks about
the range of work needed including healing work, relationship building
activities and reconstruction. I cannot do justice here to the complexity
of their analysis in the input. However, I draw your attention to
it as the matrix—and the above definition—are helpful on a number
of levels. First, the definition notes that reconciliation is a
process and not an outcome, or an event, or series of events and
activities. The same can be said for peacebuilding. Second, it talks
about the transformation of “culture” and “structure”. This encompasses
the broad parameters of most useful definitions of peacebuilding
and reconciliation, which generally involve structural change, but
also attitudinal and social transformation. Transformation as a
concept is also helpful, as it entails extensive, all-embracing
and irreversible change. This, like the definition, implies an “expansive”
view of peacebuilding and reconciliation. Taking all this into account,
it leaves me with little doubt that much peacebuilding work will
need to continue post-2006 in Ireland. However, a critical question
remains. That is, does the current understanding and future vision
of funding for peacebuilding in the Republic of Ireland and Northern
Ireland accommodate the complexity implied in the definition and
matrix I mentioned?
In light of this question I would like to make three points concerning
specific issues. Before doing that, however, I would like to note
that I make these points within a context of appreciating the historical
opportunity afforded by funding agencies, donors and the EU in the
peace process in and about Northern Ireland. My comments will hopefully
help refine and improve this process, rather than be used as a way
of dismissing these valuable contributions. That said, my first
point is that I am not convinced that implicit within current funding
strategies is a genuine appreciation of what “a long-term” commitment
to peacebuilding and reconciliation process is, and what this involves.
For example, at times, it appears that the funding environment is
overly determined by technical language that favours outcomes over
supporting process and long-term engagement. Often the method of
evaluation and verification of funded work inadvertently drives
the agenda, rather than the other way around. Although our deliberations
today are broader than PEACE II, I use the example of the concept
of “employability” implicit in much of its funding criteria as it
provides for a good example. Of course, the concept of “employability”
is helpful from some programmes where unemployment is critical—however,
where it is used as a measure of success in other areas, I am less
sure of its utility. For example, demanding that many victim groups
orientate their work to ensure their members are employed, or trained
with a specific skill, often misses the valuable work such groups
are doing such as advocacy, commemoration, day-to-day support, giving
people a voice, building cross-community relationships, and providing
a listening ear. Concepts like “employability” often find their
way into funding programmes because ‘levels of employment’ or ‘number
of training sessions’ is quantifiable. They may not be the best
measure available, or an accurate descriptor of what work is being
undertaken, but they are easy to measure. The result is that the
qualitative aspects of voluntary work—which is more difficult to
measure in terms of impact—falls by the wayside, or is redefined
with a whole new set of jargon. This can be problematic for peacebuilding,
which by definition demands an “expansive” view of social reality
not a limiting one.
Secondly—for the sake of debate—I would like to raise the issue
of ‘target groups’. The funding process generally requires that
proposals for peacebuilding highlight with whom the work is specifically
taking place. Of course, this is necessary on some levels as certain
groups such as women are marginalised and require specific attention.
However, in deeply divided societies we need to be careful that
such ‘targeting’ does not start to create more factions, and in
so doing limit our view of social complexity. A “target group” is
essentially a descriptive concept, a form of social short hand.
“Target groups” generally bear little resemblance to actual social
reality, which is always changing. Individuals generally fall into
more than one category simultaneously. As such, we need to be careful
not to use loose descriptive concepts like “targets groups” as if
they are explanations of how our society is structured. If we do
this it is easy to start to believe our own rhetoric of what a divided
society looks like. This can confuse cause and effect. Being overly
wedded to “target groups” can result in the funding of pockets of
work in “high impact” areas or to specific groups. This can continue
to perpetuate the idea that conflict has its roots specific areas,
or is caused by difference between specific individuals and groups.
As such large-scale political conflict stops being a society-wide
phenomenon and we treat the symptom as if it was a cause.
Recently, I wrote: "…injecting funds and developing evidence-based
economic programmes and training in “target areas” in a specific
timeframe…is meant to create stability and increase opportunities
for peace and reconciliation over time. At the same time, other
communities do not require the same level of attention as they are
already developed economically. This creates the first problem.
This reasoning implies that the conflict in Northern Ireland was
only about these so-called discrete communities that show high disadvantage.
It sustains the myth that conflict in society can erupt in certain
areas and sustain itself in isolation. This further erroneously
implies that genuine reconciliation is not about dealing with difference
between social groupings and classes across society, but about moving
those from ‘troubled’ areas on to the same footing as everyone else
and this will solve the problem. This may well help, but it is doubtful
if it is that simple in a deeply divided society (4)".
I am not completely against ‘targeting’, but all too often I have
seen how it limits the horizons of peacebuilding, rather than expanding
them. We need to consider the issue more seriously. This leads me
to my third point, namely that I am of the opinion that the best
vehicle for safeguarding democracy in the future and embedding peace
in any society is through ensuring a healthy, vibrant and active
civil society. Voluntary and community groups being forced to only
offer clear “project work” often means that groups get caught up
with their deliverables and how much funding they get from donors,
rather than understanding their role as being first and foremost
about ensuring long-term interaction with local and national governments.
In my opinion, many in the peacebuilding field in the Republic of
Ireland and Northern Ireland are failing to fully comprehend this
point, and the extent of what is needed in a post-settlement phase.
Independent civil society, or what Goulding calls “non-aligned local
institutions” (6) need to be built, protected and
given sufficient resources to evolve into critical peacemaking partners.
To build peace over time we need to be maintain structures in society
that can continue to enhance citizenship, ensure public access to
political institutions, and guarantee an ongoing public shaping
of government and government policy. This view of the need to build
civil institutions is not always compatible with funding strategies
that demand a short-term and project-driven focus. Ensuring organisations
can be maintained requires a more “expansive” view of why and how
civil society orientated work should be supported. Peacebuilding
is not only about conflict resolution and management, or supporting
those victimised by violence. What is needed is a move away from
an obsession with project-deadlines and targets with more attention
being given to how do we deliver a sustainable independent, active
and cross-community civil society in the years to come. This is
the task of funding agencies, government and organisations. Much
work will need to be done with voluntary groups and funding agencies
alike so they can recognise the imperative of this, and address
their own internal challenges and limits to their vision of long-term
peacebuilding. Of course, monitoring and evaluation needs to be
part of this. However, the building of organisational capacity and
enhancing public participation long into the future needs to become
a respected goal of peacebuilding work in its own right.
What I have said, is naturally open to challenge. I know the response
to my comments only too well. That is, political and economic reality
cannot always guarantee long-term funding. It is easier to justify
short-term, results orientated and delivery orientated programmes,
especially ones that fit with government funding cycles. My response
to this is simple. Although peacemaking is a pragmatic task, peacebuilding
is a vision orientated task. If fiscal and political pragmatism
is allowed to determine an agenda for peace, peacebuilding is doomed
from the outset. We have a long way to go in developing this vision.
One of the funding agencies’ tasks in this should be to assist in
creating an enabling environment in which an appropriate vision
can be realised. To this end—and in conclusion—I think some specific
practical issues may need to be considered as we look to post-2006
in Ireland.
These points are extracted from international experience and my
work with the Office of Psychosocial
Issues at the Free University in Berlin (7).
They are:
1. Core costs need to be recognised as instrumental to building
organisations over time. This building of non-aligned and active
organisations is the best way to protect peace in the long-run.
As I noted above, building civil society in itself needs to become
a respected goal of peacebuilding work in its own right.;
2. We need to constantly remind ourselves that community development
is not a linear process. To put it glibly, programmes in peacebuilding
are often structured on a “health to wealth to nothing” model. The
logic of this is that following conflict we need to first mend people’s
physical and mental health, then we need to move to job-creation
and get them employed ensuring they will become self-sustainable,
and funding can be withdrawn. The process of peacebuilding is unfortunately
more enigmatic than that and is never linear—investments must be
long-term and funding structures capable of adaptation and change;
3. We need to analyse our use and reliance on the concept of sustainability.
Do we really know what sustainability means? We need to accept that
most voluntary agencies see the word ‘sustainability’ as a code
for ‘the money is running out, find a way to support yourself’.
This is aggravated by the fact that funding agencies do not seem
to have a unified view of what sustainability is and how it can
be practically achieved;
4. Money and funding is very helpful in financing peacebuilding
programmes, but peace in itself cannot be bought. Although the colloquial
phrase often heard in Northern Ireland “peace by prosperity” may
hold some truth, employment and social reconstruction will not in
themselves ameliorate sectarian attitudes, or ensure a culture of
peace and tolerance. We need to focus on the ‘software’ of peacebuilding
through programmes for peace that aim to transform attitude and
culture;
5. In terms of outcomes for projects, we need to break ‘the culture
of lies’. Funders often know that when voluntary groups fill in
evaluation forms and tick outcome and indicator boxes they are not
accurately reflecting what they do. Funded organisations also know
when they write proposals they are merely trying to squeeze their
work into predetermined guidelines losing the full complexity of
their work. It is a shared and tolerated “lie”. Let us acknowledge
this. To this end, more sophisticated models of evaluating the impact
of social interventions are needed from funders. In turn, voluntary
groups need to learn to describe what they do more accurately. In
addition, they need to extensively document what they do so that
qualitative evaluation can replace a quantitative approach, which
will never adequately represent social reality.
6. Finally, we need to continue to interrogate what we mean by a
long-term and strategic approach to peacebuilding. In this paper,
I have chosen to call this—borrowing from John-Paul Lederach—an
“expansive” view of peacebuilding. We need to refine this message
so that politicians and the public at large can champion the cause
in a way that is appreciative of the long-term project ahead. To
this end, developing a vision that is truly expansive—yet underpinned
with pragmatism—needs to remain the ultimate goal.
References
(1)
Ropers, N. (1995). Peaceful Intervention: Structures, Processes
and Strategies for the Constructive Resolution of Ethnopolitical
Conflicts. Berghof Report No. 1., p.37. See http://www.b.shuttle.de/berghof/eng/ind_pub.htm.
(2)
John Paul Lederach (2002). The Horizon of Peacebuilding: The Strategic
Challenges of Post Agreement Change. RIREC Conference, September
26, 2002
(3)
ADM/CPA Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (2000). Reconciliation
Report: Southern Border Counties in Ireland. Monaghan: ADM/CPA Programme
for Peace and Reconciliation, p.vi.
(4)
Hamber, B. (2002). Maximising our contributions to building peace
and reconciliation. Paper presented at the Standing Community Convention
16 December 2002, Armagh City Hotel, Northern Ireland. See http://www.brandonhamber.com/publications/pap-peacebuilding1.htm
(5)
Catherine Barnes (Ed), (2002), Owning the process: Public participation
in peacemaking, Accord: an International review of peace initiatives.
London: Conciliation Resources. See http://www.c-r.org/accord/peace/accord13/
(6)
These points have largely been developed in a broad international
frame with some reference to Northern Ireland, but also elsewhere.
They were developed in conjunction with the Office
of Psychosocial Issues at the Free University in Berlin with
whom I collaborate. I am specifically appreciative to Dr David Becker,
as some these points have developed directly from his international
experience in Bosnia and elsewhere, and discussions between with
him.
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